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Palmore v. Sidoti
Collette Harrell

Issue
Does the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause preclude consideration of a stepparent involved in
miscegenation when determining custody awards? To what
extent can similar standards be applied to interracial adoption
issues?
Facts
Linda and Anthony Sidoti, two Caucasians, divorced in
Florida in May of 1980. Linda was awarded custody of thei
three year-old daughter, Melanie. In September 1981,
Anthony challenged the custody award, asserting that an
"extreme change" in the child's living conditions warranted
awarding him custody. The "extreme change" referred to
Linda cohabiting with an African-American, Clarence
Palmore, Jr. 1
1
Palmore was Linda's fiance and they subsequently married in November
1981. Anthony also accused Linda of failing to provide adequate care for the
daughter's hygiene, namely that his daughter had contracted head lice and worn
a mildew-stained article of clothing to school. However, the claim of hygiene
neglect was never substantiated and never addressed by the court. The only
question remaining for consideration by the Supreme Court was whether the
mother's interracial marriage should affect her right to custody of her daughter.
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Background
Prior to Palmore v Sidoti, some courts viewed a child
custody litigant's interracial cohabitation or marriage as a
valid adverse factor when deciding if residing in the interracial
home "served the child's best interest" (Weinstock 251). A
majority of opinions fell under three categories: (1) those who
regarded interracial relationships as relevant to custody
determination, (2) those who regarded interracial
relationships as irrelevant to custody determination, and
(3)those who regarded consideration of an interracial
relationship as unconstitutional (Weinstock 252).
A multitude of judgements have regarded the interracial
marriage of a party as not only relevant but also influential
when determining the child's custody. For example, in Niles
v. Niles, the custody of two children changed to the father as a
result of the mother's interracial relationship. The court
explained the rationale of this case in that interracial homes
presented subjection to unnecessary complications and social
pressures that would not otherwise exist, to be "unacceptable
to the father ... and to the society in which we live" (Niles).
In Niles, the best interest of the children bore the utmost
importance. However, of primary consideration was the
probability of community and familial hostility toward the
new interracial family. Niles also illustrated the tendencies of
courts to emphasize other inadequacies of the involved party
in the interracial relationship. The mother's "promiscuous"
conduct while the children were in the apartment was
considered a basis for custody denial, although attempts made

emphasized and exaggerated the inadequacy and instability of
the miscegenetic parent seeking custody (Weinstock 235).
These ad hominem attacks believe the real basis for the antimiscegenation award: discrimination.
Concurrently, some courts viewed interracial marriage as
irrelevant to custody decisions. For example, in
Commonwealth ex. rei Lucas v Kreischer, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court discussed the impropriety involved when an
interracial relationship served as a determining factor in
custody battles. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned
that in a multiracial society prejudice was inevitable, but the
matter of greatest importance was that the child was residing
in a loving and stable home so they could overcome any
prejudice they may be faced with (Kreischer).
Finally, a minority claimed unconstitutionality under the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Delander v. Delander the California Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional the alteration of a mother's custody right
after she had engaged in miscegenation. If the court altered
custody right, the California Supreme Court reasoned it
would, "constitute a judicial determination that a black
stepfather is not equal to a white stepfather." Niles,
Commonwealth, and Delander illustrate the inconsistent
nature of custody cases involving miscegenation prior to the
Supreme Court's judgement in Palmore.

Florida Circuit Court's Decision
To modify an existing custody order, according to
Florida law, proof of a "substantial change" in the child's
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living situation must exist (Blackwood 219). The father only
noted two unsubstantiated claims of negligence: the child's
hygiene, and the mother's involvement in an interracial
relationship with an African-American. In response to these
accusations, the Florida circuit court granted the father
custody of his daughter.
The court based its decision on a limited number of
premises. First, the court adversely inferred the mother's
attitude toward her child because she had a sexual relationship
with Clarence without being married while maintaining
custody of her daughter. The court concluded that the
mother, "places gratification of her own desires ahead of her
concern for the child's welfare" (Palmore). In addition to this
accusation, the court explained the following reasoning:
"This Court feels that despite the strides that have been made
in bettering relations between the races in this country, it is
inevitable that Melanie will, if allowed to remain in her
present situation and attains school age and thus more
vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social
stigmatization that is sure to come" (falmore).
The reasoning applied to Niles, similarly applied to the
Palmore case, was the hypothetical stigmatization which may
result form society's prejudices. Mrs. Palmore then appealed
the circuit court's decision to the Second District Court of
Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the previous opinion.
Supreme Court's Decision and Reasoning
After granting certiorari to Mrs. Palmore, the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the opinion of Florida's Second
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District of Court of Appeals. Chief Justice Burger eloquently
expressed the consensus of the Supreme Court.
Whatever problems racially-mixed households may
pose for children in 1984 can no more support a
denial of constitutional right than could the stresses
that residential integration was thought to entail in
1917. The effects of racial prejudice, however real,
cannot justify a racial classification removing and
infant child from the custody of its natural mother
found to be an appropriate person to have such
custody (Palmore).
The Supreme Court believed that, had Melanie's mother
cohabited with and married a Caucasian, the challenge of her
custody of her daughter would have failed (Goode 329).
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the state's
admirable intentions to meet the best interests of the child,
the Supreme Court precluded the state from denying custody
based on the mother's interracial marriage (Silverberg 347).
In justifying and explaining their ruling, the Supreme
Court applied previously established laws created through
three monumental cases: McLaughlin v. Florida, Loving v.
Virginia, and Buchanan v. Warley. Charles P. Wisdom
summarized the Supreme Court's rationale behind
prohibiting racial prejudice from being a controlling factor in
the removal of a child form a presumably fit parent for
custody explaining: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose
to "eradicate government-imposed racial discrimination" and
(2) the law's impermissibility to either directly or indirectly
create or accomplish private racial biases (500).
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First and foremost, the Supreme Court ruled that the
lower court failed to rule in accordance with the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
constitution, as interpreted in McLaughlin v. Florida and
Loving v. Virginia (Silverberg 345). The sole purpose of this
amendment is to eradicate any "governmentally-imposed
discrimination based on race" (Palmore). In McLaughlin, the
Supreme Court overturned a Florida statue which renounced
cohabitation between Caucasians and African-Americans.
The court proclaimed the classification of race as a factor
subjected to most "exacting scrutiny" and it must be explained
by a "compelling governmental interest" and "necessary to
the accomplishment of their legislative purpose"

(McLaughlin).
In Loving, an interracial couple married in Washington,
D.C. and then moved to Virginia where they directly violated
the state's ban on interracial marriage. To the Loving
situation the Supreme Court again applied "strict scrutiny,"
and found no "legitimate state purpose for the law"
(Blackwood 211). Application of this same "strict scrutiny"
to Palmore yielded the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that
the state government had violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court specifically addressed
the issue of "suffer[ing] from the social stigmatization that is
sure to come" (Palmore), and mentioned a previous instance,
Buchanan v. Warley, where recognized racial prejudice had
been conjured up to justify racial classifications. This
Supreme Court opinion found the Kentucky law

unconstitutional which forbade African-Americans from
owning real estate in predominantly Caucasian
neighborhoods. Similar to Palmore, the reasoning of this case
addressed the issue of potential societal problems likely to
arise due to the integration of different races (/3uchanan). In
response to this argument, in both instances, the Supreme
Court acknowledged, "private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect"(Palmore).

Effects
Although relatively short and precise, the implications of
Supreme Court's ruling are broad. What are the actual effects
of Palmore? This case should not be interpreted to mean
courts forbid consideration of race in custody claims.
Specifically, the courts prohibited consideration of the social
stigmatizing effects of racial prejudice on a child with a
miscegenetic custodian. The Supreme Court's narrow
wording failed to prohibit consideration of the implicit
consequences that placing a child into an interracial home
might have on the child itself. Moreover, Palmore's
applicability to circumstances involving removing a child
form its biological parent when otherwise the parent is a fit
guardian, is self-evident (Weinstock 260). However, to what
extent can Palmore be applied to interracial adoptions?
Applicability to Interracial Adoption
Because of basic similarities between custody and
adoption cases, it has been cogently argued that the
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conclusions of Palmore should be applied directly to
interracial adoption issues. The most apparent commonality
of these two proceedings involves the adjudication of the
custody and control of the child. In both circumstances, the
child's welfare and best interests are of preeminent
importance C:Weinstock 262).
Marshall H. Silverberg posed the following question,
"Why should the analysis be different in an adoption
proceeding where the resultant racial composition is identical
to the one resulting form the situation in Palmore and where
the goal is also the best interests of the child?" (351-352).
Justice O'Connor argued that Silverberg failed to identify the
important differences between adoption and custody
proceedings (Silverberg 351). Adoption cases involve some
issues not present in custody cases, such as the availability of
biological parents. Major differences exist between a
biological relationship and a state-conferred relationship,
therefore, it was argued, these cases must be treated quite
differently C:Wisdom 504). Courts play a more active role in
adoption cases because they are faced with the burdensome
task of attempting to place a child with a compatible family,
while no such issue exists in custody proceedings (Blackwood
224).
In adoption cases, courts have generally attempted to
place children in the custody of those individuals with similar
racial features. The rationale is that children more easily
integrate into families with racial characteristics similar to
their own. Expert testimonies of psychiatrists, psychologists,
and social workers acknowledges the advantageous aspect of
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racial matching and the problematic effects of placing children
in the custody of racially different families C:Weinsto~k 262).
For these reasons, race has historically has been considered
important in adoption proceedings wh~n the ?eed to
determine the "best interests" of the child C:Wisdom 497).
Although usually considered a factor, race must not be
the only factor. Crucial to the child's development of an .
adequate sense of personal identity .is integratio~ of the child
into the new home. Robert B. Wemstock explamed the three
different facets of personal identity as: (1) a sense of
'belonging' in a stable family and comm~nity, .(2) ,a feeli.n~ of
self-esteem and confidence, and (3) 'survival skills providmg
the child with the ability to cope with the world outside the
family (264). Failure to establish personal identity can be .
catastrophic to the child. Courts continue. to rule that. a child
living in an environment of different race mterfere~ With the
child's personal identity development and can possibl~ result
in a myriad of psychological and social problems C:Wemstock
265). Because of the importance of developi.ng a p.e~son~l
identity, which can be troublesome for a child ~esidmg m a
household of different race, courts should contmue to take
race into account when determining the best interests of the
child.
However, if the above reasoning was a sound conclusion,
it must successfully withstand the "strict scrutiny" test of
classifying races, just as in Palmore. There remains the
mandate to promote a compelling government interes~ to
overcome the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protectiOn
requirements. The Supreme Court recently ruled on the
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permissibility to consider race, if used "in a nondiscriminatory fashion" and the impact is without "racially
discriminatory intent"(Wisdom 508). To fulfill the
requirement of the equal protection clause, the courts devised
a three-step analysis applicable to racial issue circumstances.
Weinstock explained the three-step process : (1) in an
adoption dispute between two parties of different races,
initially it must be determined how each family's race will
probably affect the child's capacity to establish a sense of both
personal and racial identity, (2) subsequently, the court must
compare the multiple families in this regard, (3) finally, the
court must weigh the significance of racial differences
between the families in relation to the various other factors
applicable to adoption determinations (Weinstock 264).
Evidently, individualization of each circumstance should
occur. The creation of a rigorous, three-step screening
process would adequately ensure the constitutionality of
including race as a factor in interracial adoption cases.
. One i~portan~ implication of Palmore is its applicability
to mterractal adopt10n cases. In the Supreme Court's opinion
of Palmore, hypothetical effects of societal and racial
prejudices were not considered in adoption proceeding
(Blackwood 224). The primary purpose of factoring race in
adoption proceedings attempted to provide a natural
environment for the child, conducive to the development of
the child's personal identification. Therefore, any
discrimination suffered by the child from society should be
considered irrelevant.
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Conclusion
The precedent setting Supreme Court decision of
Palmore v. Sidoti changed the role a guardian's miscegenation
constitutionally plays in child custody determination. The
Supreme Court declared the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited race consideration in
making custody awards. While sound reasoning yielded this
conclusion in child custody cases, this reasoning should not
be applied to interracial adoption issues because of the basic
difference of interests involved. To each unique adoption
dispute the three-step determination process should be
individually applied.
Nevertheless, regardless of the societal discrimination a
child may suffer as a result of determinations made in custody
and adoption cases, the likelihood a child will suffer
discrimination cannot be a factor in a priori determination
due to the omnipresence of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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The Significance of
Caban v Mohammed and Its
Application to the Adoption of Newborns
Shannon Fry

Caban v Mohammed was a significant case concerning the
rights of unwed fathers. The case demonstrated the entitlement
of certain rights and privileges in the adoption process to
unmarried fathers who show an interest in their children, and
also helped answer the question of who has a voice in the
adoption of newborns. To better understand the significance of
Caban, two critical, preceding cases, which dealt with the rights
of unmarried fathers in adoption, will be introduced. Analysis
of Caban v Mohammed will follow an examination of these two
cases. Finally, an explanation of the determination process
when deciding whether or not an unmarried father should have
a voice in his newborn child's adoption procedures, while still
maintaining the best interests of the child, will be given.
Stanley v Illinois marked "the beginning of the
contemporary development on unwed fathers' rights" (Sturgill
988). Before Stanley, unwed fathers did not have many rights,
the mother held the legal rights to the child. Stanley helped to
alter this practice.
The Stanleys lived together periodically for approximately
eighteen years. During this time, Stanley "actively supported"

